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Professor Nelson's Americanization of the Common Law re-
cords the conclusions of a mighty research project. The author has
undertaken a comprehensive account of the changes in Massa-
chusetts law over a period of 70 years. Anyone who has ever been
tempted to tackle a project of this magnitude has been humbled
quickly enough by the immense problems of assembling the
sources. Legal records, especially those of the colonial period, are
typically mountainous in bulk, difficult of access and untracked by
previous researchers. Nelson has overcome this obstacle, however:
he has read not only all the published case reports and statutes for
his period, but also "all available manuscript material, including
unpublished judicial opinions, lawyers' notes, and, most com-
monly, records of pleadings, judgments, and other papers incorpo-
rated into official court files" (p. vii). This exhaustive coverage of
the sources' means that when Nelson mentions creditors' remedies
or pleading rules, we can be extraordinarily confident that he is not
guessing the shape of a larger bulk, but knows the thing itself; we
learn what there is to know.2 Moreover, this mass of detail has
been succinctly and lucidly reported.
Yet, although Nelson traverses every inch of ground, he has
chosen some odd boundaries for his study. The "law" in this work
consists largely of the rules applied by courts. We learn a lot about
criminal law, contracts, debtor-creditor relationships, land and
water use, corporations and master-servant rules. In a few con-
texts, Nelson gives us glimpses of the law in action as well. In his
discussions of civil procedure, for example, he considers jury dis-
1 This is as good a place as any to complain about the production of this book.
The Harvard University Press has not only bunched all the footnotes in the back
-especially annoying in a book aiming to serve as a guide to its sources (p. viO)-but
has printed footnote numbers in brackets in the same type size as the body of the
text, thus breaking up sentences without even rewarding the reader with a footnote
at the bottom of the page.
2 In this respect Nelson's study goes beyond its predecessor as the most com-
plete record of 18th century Massachusetts practice since the superb edition of the
LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965).
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cretion and the practices followed by litigants in framing responsive
pleadings; in analyzing criminal law, he reports the types of of-
fenses for which people were prosecuted. Otherwise, the author
pays practically no attention to aspects of the legal order other than
its formal rules. For instance, he ignores changes in the structure
and functions of the legal profession, or in the social origins or
political affiliations of the judiciary.
Most legal historians would have chosen the same emphasis.
In Nelson's book, however, the limitations of the traditional mate-
rials of legal history are notably perverse because Nelson's goal is
far different from that of traditional historians. 3 He seeks to relate
legal change to "more basic changes in American thought and so-
ciety" (p. vii). To that end, he seeks to fit his account into a
framework of general social change, a framework he expects will
help to explain specific incidents of legal change and will be illus-
trated by them.
That effort represents both the book's greatest ambitions and
its deepest flaws. The shortcomings, as I see them, are the author's
monolithic view of the nature of social change and his often unsup-
ported connections between social change and transformations in
legal rules. Those basic points in Nelson's study are so oversim-
plified that they lead repeatedly to a distorted and idiosyncratic
interpretation. The following analysis takes up each of these prob-
lems in turn.
I
The book begins with a characterization-a sort of still photo-
graph--of Massachusetts in 1760 as a society almost frozen in
stasis: a collection of tightly-knit corporate communities-stable,
homogeneous, harmonious, religious. Such a society would not
seem to possess any notable internal dynamic, and in Nelson's ac-
count it does not. Rather, it is the American Revolution, portrayed
in this book as a mysterious event originating from outside the
community, which seizes this peaceful society and sets off its rapid
metamorphosis into a polar opposite society-atomistic, acquisitive,
competitive, materialistic, secular, relativistic, utilitarian. As the
society mutated, so did its law. A legal system devoted in the 18th
century to the maintenance of what Nelson calls "ethical unity" and
of economic and social stability, became, by the 19th century, sim-
ply a forum for competition among diverse interest groups seek-
ig power and wealth.
3 See text accompanying note 31 infra.
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This view of prerevolutionary society depends heavily on
Michael Zuckerman's study of Massachusetts, Peaceable King-
doms. 4 That work, perhaps more than any other analysis of the
18th century, stresses the existence of communitarian consensus in
what the author believes to have been the only important unit of
social life-the town. Other historians argue that that picture of
consensus better describes the world of 1720 than of 1760, by
which time the Christian corporate communities of New England
were breaking up under the tensions created by generational con-
flicts, by new settlers competing for land and by the religious
schisms of the Great Awakening. 5 Nelson's fidelity to the Zucker-
man thesis is, in fact, rather remarkable in view of the criticism
that thesis has provoked, 6 and of Nelson's often differing interpre-
tations (e.g., of the significance of litigation in prerevolutionary
Massachusetts).
7
The real problem with Nelson's pre- and postrevolutionary so-
cial paradigms, however, is not that they reflect the minority view
among historians, but that he rigidifies the structure of social
change. While there was obviously an overall pattern of change
from provincial corporate communitarianism to the individualism of
Jacksonian America, it is absurd to suppose that this pattern was
replicated in every detail of social life.
For example, Nelson repeatedly contrasts the religious, other-
worldly values of the 18th century with the pecuniary ones of the
4 M. ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS: NEw ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1970).
5 See, e.g., R. BUSHMAN, FROM PURITAN TO YANKEE: CHARACTER AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER IN CONNECTICUT, 1690-1765, at 186-95, 235-38, 257-88 (1967); A.
HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND: FROM THE GREAT AWAKENING TO
THE REVOLUTION 2-14, 88-93, 129-30, 136, 251-60 (1966); K. LOCKIUDGE, A NEW
ENGLAND TOWN: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS: DEDHAM, MASSACHUSETTS,
1636-1736, at 79-163 (1970); 1 W. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT,
1630-1833, at 329-488 (1971).
6 For criticisms especially relevant to law in provincial Massachusetts, see Mur-
rin, Review Essay, 11 HISTORY & THEORY: STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
HISTORY 226, 245-72 (1972), and Wroth, Review Essay: Possible Kingdoms: The New
England Town from the Perspective of Legal History, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 318
(1971).
7 ZUCKERMAN, supra note 4, at 89-92. Nelson adverts to this matter in a footnote
(p. 185 n.5), taking the position that the presence of litigation does not mean that
consensus was not still "the ideal toward which Massachusetts communities strived."
He says that litigation may in fact have been an integrative force, tending to
strengthen "social unity and stability," and finally, that "the lawsuits that were
brought could not have been resolved if they had been destructive of the underlying
ethical consensus in Massachusetts." One can only conclude that, although Zucker-
man and Nelson may both be right to argue that provincial Massachusetts was a
consensus society, a writer who takes the absence, and one who takes the presence,
of litigation as an index of consensus probably do not have the same conception of
"consensus."
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19th, an opposition that limits his ability to perceive the complex
interrelationship between ethics and economics in both societies.
In Puritan New England, people emphatically refused to distin-
guish money-making endeavors from religious life. They thought it
entirely proper for men to labor in their callings to increase their
stock of wealth, but, when this activity produced an increasingly
luxury-loving society, they experienced confusion and guilt. As
Perry Miller put it, "the wrong thing," acquisitiveness, "was also
the right thing."8 Indeed, the revivalism of the Great Awakening
may have been most intense where settlers bad achieved the
greatest commercial success. 9 There are similar conflicts at the
base of the Jacksonian character. No people as purely economically
oriented as Nelson's social types of the Jacksonian era could have
responded as deeply as Jacksonians did to a rhetoric of yeoman
virtue, simplicity and frugality.10
Nelson draws another rigid dichotomy between ethical unit),
and ethical relativism. Massachusetts, by his description, changed
from a society whose members were expected to subscribe unan-
imously to one set of religiously-derived values to one in which
values were believed to be wholly subjective (p. 115). This change
is illustrated by the withdrawal of the state's legal system from en-
forcement of a unitary ethical standard. Gradually deviations from
the standard were no longer punished under the criminal law, and
institutions for promoting compliance with accepted values-includ-
ing the established churches-lost support. Like the ethics/econom-
ics dichotomy, this one corresponds crudely to differences between
provincial and Jacksonian societies. Yet it completely fails, for ex-
ample, to account for the evangelical impulse behind the disestab-
lishment of churches. Pietists, more than rationalists, urged the
state to disestablish religion on the ground that a voluntary system of
religious worship and financial support would help to eliminate reli-
gious conflict (at least among Protestants) and would encourage
the spread of Christianity."' In fact, perceptive visitors like Alexis de
Tocqueville12 and Philip Schaff13 concluded that voluntarism had
8 P. MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: FROM COLONY TO PROVINCE 51 (1967).
9 BusImAN, supra note 5, at 188-91.
10 See M. MEYERS, THE JACxSONiAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 12-17,
115-18, 132-35, 152-53 (1957).
1 See generally McLoughlin, The Role of Religion in the Revolution: Liberty of
Conscience and Cultural Cohesion in the New Nation, in ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 197,247-55 (S. Kurtz & J. Hutson eds. 1973).
19 1 A. DE TOCQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN A.%ERICA 300-14 (P. Bradley ed. & H.
Reeve transl. 1945).
13 P. SCHAFF, AMEIGCA: A SKETCH OF ITS POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS
CHARACTER 73-82 (P. Miller ed. 1961).
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contributed to establishing a degree of cultural homogeneity unap-
proachable in European society.
These simplified social categories do no harm as long as they
are left as dicta, or as incidental commentaries on the main text.
Occasionally, they even help to explain the legal data. That is true,
for example, of Nelson's valuable treatment of changes in contract
law from an 18th century system in which community notions of
fair exchange generally determined the terms of an obligation to a
19th century system which enforced the parties' express intentions
(pp. 54-61, 136-43). Trends in criminal law also fit Nelson's general
thesis of secularization. He finds that, starting in the 1780's, crime
gradually ceased to be viewed as sin: prosecutions for minor sexual
offenses, for missing church and for Sabbath-breaking dwindled. At
the same time, prosecutions for theft increased. "By the turn of the
century," he says, "the criminal was no longer envisioned as a sin-
ner against God but rather as one who preyed on the property of
his fellow citizens" (p. 118).
Generally, however, the rigidity of Nelson's categories leaves
him in the predicament of a biologist with a collection of unadjust-
able microscopes. If the fixed focus isn't just right for the object,
the image comes through fuzzily. For example, Nelson explores
property law chiefly through the categories of communitarianism
and individualism. This is an unhappy choice for analyzing any so-
ciety. Nelson sees rules restricting property uses as communitarian
and rules expanding such uses as individualistic. But the relation-
ship of ideology and practice is frequently more complex; it is not
unusual for framers of property rules to argue that individual ful-
fillment is maximized by strict regulation of some property uses or
that the community as a whole will profit from leaving other uses
unregulated. Furthermore, since any system specifying property
rights inevitably both recognizes and restricts such rights, Nelson
has placed himself in the position of trying to describe differences
between 18th and 19th century property law by reference to ele-
ments common to both periods. He is further entangled by his
desire to fit property law into his general framework of social
change-a change from communitarianism to individualism.
Difficulties appear as soon as Nelson starts feeding the evi-
dence through the categories. We learn that in provincial Mas-
sachusetts, "[r]ights in property were not granted for the benefit of
the individual; on the contrary, property rights received legal pro-
tection only to the extent that a person used his property consis-
tently with the community's interests" (p. 51). Property was, there-
fore, subject to extensive regulation (pp. 51-52). For example, the
community sought social stability by restricting competition for
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uses of property (pp. 47-54). We might expect to be told that post-
revolutionary property law expressed the growth of individualistic
ideology by lifting these anti-competitive restraints. Such a trend is
indeed discernible by the time that the Charles River Bridge
case 14 is decided by the Massachusetts court in 1829 (pp. 161-63).
But on the contrary, immediately after the revolution the courts
expanded the kinds of first-user property rights that the law was
willing to protect from the incursions of competitive, would-be
users (pp. 121-26). This development puzzles Nelson (p. 126), be-
cause it reveals not only that his categories are too rigid but also
that they are fundamentally unsound. As Nelson himself observes:
the postrevolutionary rules allocating property did not result in in-
creased individual liberty; they merely identified the individuals who
would enjoy it. For every person who gained liberty by obtaining
protection of a property right, some other person usually lost at least
an equivalent amount of liberty (p. 126).
If specification of property rights is always this sort of zero-sum
game, it is hard to see how any particular regime of property rules
could ever be more individualistic than any other.' 5
The same analytic confusion pervades Nelson's treatment of
postrevolutionary public works that devalued neighboring prop-
erties-projects such as the enlargement of jail yards and the im-
provement of public roads (pp. 131-32). Nelson says that these ac-
tions signify that "private property" had come to be seen as "a value
of less importance than promotion of the will of a democratic major-
ity" (p. 130). This comment is an effort to preserve his general thesis
of the growth of individualistic attitudes in the 19th century by
redefining individualism to embrace the political aggregation of
individual wills into a "democratic majority." Confusion deepens
when, two pages later, he undertakes to summarize trends in prop-
erty law as a whole:
1
4 Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 419 (1837), affg 24 Mass. (7 Pick) 344 (1829). The Court held that the first
proprietors of a bridge over the Charles River did not possess a monopoly over that
waterway.
15 Yet Nelson attempts to explain that expansion of property rights by noting that
the postrevolutionary generation equated "the protection of property with the pres-
ervation of liberty' (p. 126).
Arguably, however, property rights were expanded because people were becom-
ing more sophisticated about the variety of resources susceptible to commercial ex-
ploitation, and believed that conferring monopoly rights on a user was a necessary
incentive to potential exploiters. This argument is both plausible and consistent with
Nelson's general observations about the role of law in promoting economic growth
(pp. 145-64).
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[In the view of the Massachusetts court, a] rapacious, and author-
itarian crown, which threatened the liberty and stability of Mas-
sachusetts communities, had been replaced by the majoritarian and
egalitarian democracy of the Age of Jackson. The interests of com-
munity and of selfish individualism bad changed sides. Absolute and
total protection of the owner in his enjoyment of property no longer
seemed necessary to the interest of community; instead, the individual
now appeared as an obstruction to continued social progress, liberty,
and equality-a perception that emerged with particular clarity in
cases involving the limits of jail yards. By 1830, in short, private
property was ceasing to be seen as an institution that promoted
community values and was becoming instead a tool for the aggran-
dizement of the individual (pp. 132-33) (emphasis added).
What is going on? We were once told that 18th century law re-
stricted property uses in the interests of community; now we hear
that it gave owners "[a]bsolute and total protection." Now 19th cen-
tury law is cast in the role of restricting property in the interests of
community. The judges had come to think of property as a vehicle
for selfish individualism, and thus believed they had to control it
for the sake of community values.
Yet just as the reader has reconciled himself to this revised
perspective, Nelson pulls another switch. He cheerfully relates
how these same judges gradually privatized the law of corporations
and of contracts, releasing market behavior from the constraints of
governmentally defined purposes. He concludes that "[t]he pre-
revolutionary legal system, in which community was the primary
social value, had largely been destroyed. A new system emphasiz-
ing rugged individualism as its fundamental value had begun to
take its place" (p. 143).
These contradictions derive, I think, from Nelson's insistence
that the legal system, at any given time, must express some single
set of values. As he moves from subject to subject, therefore, he is
driven to assert the dominance first of one set of values and then of
the other. Several excellent studies of law and public policy in the
19th century American states, however, suggest that state policy
embodied both individualistic and communitarian norms. The con-
tent of both norms was considerably transformed as they were used
to sanction novel forms of public support for business enterprise; as
different factions came to dominate state politics, the ideologies of
power-holders and of their opponents naturally tended to stress
whichever individualistic or communitarian elements of commonly
shared norms suited their interests.1 6 Nelson may be detecting the
16 See 0. HAND~iN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONwEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE
OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 (rev.
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influence of these ideological shifts. But explaining the rules in
these terms would require strict attention to the chronology of
events, particularly to political events outside the legal system, and
would require abandonment of the thesis of universal and unidirec-
tional social change.
Nelson's simplification of social categories also causes him to
miss subtleties of interpretation. For example, in his discussion of
liquor license regulation, he describes how sessions courts in the
early 1820's routinely resisted petitions from townsmen praying for
reduction in the number of liquor licenses, but started to grant
such petitions in the late 1820's and early 1830's. He analyzes this
trend as part of the growing tendency to subordinate private prop-
erty values to the "will of a democratic majority" (p. 130). Yet the
early temperance movement in Massachusetts is probably better
understood as an attempt by a declining Federalist-Calvinist elite to
"re-establish prestige by 'lifting' the rude mass to styles of life
enunciated by an aristocratic moral authority."1 7
Similarly, Nelson sees the great Dedham Church case"' as
evidence that the legal system had grown indifferent to the en-
forcement of religion and was trying instead to deal with church
property disputes by adhering strictly to secular rules of property
law (pp. 128-29). But strict property law did not actually resolve
any of the issues in the case. The case may, therefore, represent
something more interesting-a desire to strengthen the authority
of ministers in Massachusetts by widening their corporate con-
stituencies and thus ensuring that parish majorities, even if they
left the faith of the church's founders, would be able to retain its
property.' 9
ed. 1969); L. HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENN-
SYLVANiA, 1776-1860, at 3-33, 173-75, 306-15 (1948); J. HURsT, LAW AND THE
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNrrED STATES 7, 30-32,
37-40 (1956); H. SCHEMER, Omo CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND
THE ECONOMY, 1820-1861, at 26-28, 90-94, 353-56 (1969); Horwitz, The Transforma-
tion in the Conception of Property in American Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. Ci. L REV.
248, 248-51 (1973).
17 J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE 42 (1963). A social historian of the town of
Springfield has concluded that even by the 1840's, when the temperance move-
ments became more broadly based, they remained "confident, benevolent, inclusive,
and assimilative" towards the immigrants they were trying to reform-behavior more
conformable to Nelson's 18th than to these 19th century types. Scc M. FnUsCH,
TowN INTO CrrY 36-38 (1972).
2S Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488 (1820). This case involved a dispute over succes-
sion to church property between a majority of church members (who were, however,
a minority in the parish as a whole) who adhered to the Trinitarian principles of the
church's founders, and a parish majority of Unitarians (who had called a Unitarian
minister to the church over the objections of the church members). The Unitarians
won.,' Cf. 2 McLOucmrr, supra note 5, at 1193-95.
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II
The basic datum of Nelson's study, what he terms the "law,"
is the legal rule, especially as applied by a court. But the historian
who asserts, as Nelson does, that study of the norms expressed in
legal rules tells us something about the contemporary society must
define at some point what he thinks that something is. "[T]he his-
torical task," Nelson agrees, requires "the articulation of social
theory as well as the narration of recorded facts" (p. ix). The big-
gest disappointment of this book is that it fails to articulate a viable
social theory. Rather, its implicit theories of the relationships be-
tween legal rules and social change are either incoherent or im-
plausible. In fact, these theories derive from what students in
American law schools have learned to call "policy analysis"-ex-
trapolation of the likely social consequences of the adoption of a
legal rule, using no evidence but the rule itself.
20
Policy analysis, as usually practiced, relies upon a simple
utilitarian model of the relationship between legal rules and social
behavior. Social actors in this model look to the rules as their
primary or even sole source of rewards and penalties. Their atten-
tion is riveted on the courts, so they may promptly react to any
change in the rules. Finally, social actors are presumed to be
rational-which is another way of saying that their behavior is ex-
pected to accord with the policy analyst's projections.
Nelson does not make extravagant claims for this method. His
20 The following paragraph exemplifies the growing trend to mix a bit of eco-
nomic analysis with policy analysis:
But prerevolutionary contract law probably furthered ethical unity and
stability in the allocation of wealth and status at the expense of economic effi-
ciency. Although careful empirical research would be necessary to confirm any
correlation, it seems likely that the people who gain most in freely negotiated
contracts are those with the greatest entrepreneurial skills, while those who
lose most are those with the fewest skills. Two important entrepreneurial
skills are an ability to predict future market trends and a knowledge of current
market values; a man with these skills is better able than a man without the
skills to make investments at a lower cost that are likely to satisfy future mar-
ket requirements. To the extent that a legal system seeks to maximize
economic growth and development, it should allocate resources to people who
possess such skills. The legal system of prerevolutionary Massachusetts proba-
bly retarded economic growth by impeding the efforts of such men to acquire
additional resources (pp. 62-63).
This paragraph vividly demonstrates the limited utility of this analytic method for
historical inquiry. I cannot imagine what archives might be used to assist In the
"careful empirical research" needed to support the correlation between entre-
preneurial skill and victory in freely negotiated contracts. In any event, the passage's
stress on rational calculation is poorly suited to the bubble-and-panic world of 18th
century commerce. It is not insignificant that wealth in that world was called for-
tune.
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use of it is appropriately tentative. Presumably, however, he would
not use it at all unless he thought it had some explanatory or at
least heuristic value. Its application to 18th century contract law,
however, shows that, far from generating workable research hy-
potheses, the method leads to nothing but trouble. One example
will suffice to illustrate the difficulties with this approach.
Nelson describes the various writs available to plaintiffs seek-
ing contractual or quasi-contractual remedies in provincial Mas-
sachusetts and makes a convincing case that the system of writs
imposed obstacles to compensating plaintiffs for their fall expec-
tancy when executory agreements were breached. To oversimplify
somewhat, unless a party took the trouble to write out (and
perhaps file with a justice of the peace) his agreement in advance,
and then performed his side of it, the writs available limited the
other party's obligation to a reasonable or customary return for
benefits conferred (pp. 54-61). Nelson's descriptive passage is, as
usual, clear and compact. His conclusions, however, are less im-
pressive. From the formality required for court enforcement of
promises that might be unequal, Nelson infers that
[t]o the extent that it impeded change in the allocation of
wealth, the law of contract may also have furthered ethical unity. A
person who loses money in speculative transactions or in transactions
entered into with imperfect knowledge often feels cheated. Sensing
that the person who gained at his expense did so by failing to dis-
close relevant information, he may tend to feel an animosity that may
long linger, only to arise under circumstances disruptive of commu-
nity unity. By impeding speculative bargains and bargains whose terms
did not reflect community norms of fair exchange, prerevolutionary
law reduced the likelihood of such animosity and may thus have pro-
moted social unity. By further allowing bargains in which there were
opportunities for overreaching to be made only in the presence of
others and under circumstances that promoted careful deliberation,
contract law may similarly have reduced the likelihood of social ran-
cor (p. 62).
To the extent that Nelson suggests that the system of contract
remedies affected economic behavior, the assertion seems unprov-
able. In fact, available evidence supports the contrary view. For
example, legal rules certainly did not deter trade or speculation in
land. Engaging in any sort of commerce in the 18th century en-
tailed speculation; a merchant could not even accept a bill of ex-
change without considerable risk.21 It is impossible to say whether
21See R. ZENISKY, MERCHANTS, FAiMERS, AND RIVER GODS 193 (1971).
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there would have been more speculation but for the restrictiveness
of the writs. I think it is more likely that the hostility of the official
legal system to enforcement of promissory exchanges helped to en-
sure that most exchanges would remain unaffected by the rules. As
Morton Horwitz has pointed out,
[b]usinessmen [in the 18th century] settled disputes informally among
themselves when they could, referred them to a more formal process
of arbitration when they could not .... [T]hey endeavored to find
legal forms of agreement with which to conduct business transactions
free from the equalizing tendencies of courts and juries.
22
Although Nelson might admit that his rules are not always ac-
curate guides to behavior, he might urge that they do say some-
thing about what contemporaries found desirable. What is bad or
inadequate evidence for social or economic history may still be
good evidence for the study of values and ideologies. If this is
Nelson's position, I would be happier if he advertised it more
prominently, since it is rarely clear whether his conclusions about
the social significance of legal rules relate to attitudes or to prac-
tices. At any rate, if the rules are evidence of attitudes, we need to
know whose attitudes. It will not do to adopt an a priori position
that legal rules embody the deepest-felt, commonly-held norms of
a society, or even that they embody the values of an important
elite. Some rules may survive because they are irrelevant to any-
one but an occasional litigant; no force has been at work to alter or
abolish them. Others may be "symbolic," registering the pressure
of a group with just enough influence to get its values declared in
law, but not enough to have them enforced against the rest of
society. 2
3
Nelson's own account of the legal system of provincial Mas-
sachusetts should inspire extreme caution in anyone tempted to
draw inferences about social attitudes from that system's rules. Ef-
fective law-finding power was delegated to juries, a situation in
which Nelson says that "legal change and development are imper-
ceptible." He further notes that "[e]xplicit rules of law," which
22 Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARv. L.
REv. 917, 927 (1974). The most important of these legal forms was the penal bond
with conditional defeasance, which Nelson himself calls a "highly flexible commer-
cial instrument" (p. 61). Because of informal devices like the penal bond, and the
disposition of merchants to work outside the common law writ system, the common
law of contract fails even dimly to reflect commercial practice until the very late 18th
century in England. See Thorne, Tudor Social Transformation and Legal Change, 26
N.Y.U.L. REV. 10, 19-21 (1951).
2 Cf. M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 22-43 (1964).
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counsel argued to the juries, "remain unchanged, while substantive
law is still extremely flexible in its ability to adapt itself to social
needs in individual cases" (p. 29). It is, therefore, difficult to de-
termine what the operative common lav rules were, much less
whether they reflected the attitudes of Massachusetts society. Nel-
son suggests that juries usually followed the lav as urged on them
by counsel or by the court, and rejected only "whatever parts of
that law were inconsistent with their own views of justice and mo-
rality or -with their own needs and circumstances" (p. 30). But what
were those inconsistencies? And supposing juries mostly followed
the rules, where did the rules come from? According to Nelson,
they were copied out of form and precedent books, or cited
straight from English cases and texts; they were "adhered to . . .
with a simple-minded rigor and consistency," and were rarely mod-
ified by statute or by judicial decision (p. 19). It requires some
bravery to deduce prevailing social norms from rules like these,
except on the desperate hypothesis that even mechanically bor-
rowed rules would not be used unless they served some social
need. Perhaps the social need they served was simply that of giv-
ing the impression to provincials that they lived under a fixed sys-
tem of law-an impression easily given by almost any set of rules
with a colorable common lav origin.
The problem of determining what social attitudes are ex-
pressed in provincial law becomes still more complicated if one
challenges Nelson's application of the Zuckerman thesis24 to the
world of the 1760's. If provincial society were static and homoge-
neous, organized around a stable consensus on values, then we could
sensibly suppose that formal legal institutions helped to maintain
equilibrium by discouraging deviance and by reaffirming shared
values. Kenneth Lockridge has suggested, however, that society
in 1760 was increasingly "polarize[d] . . . along lines of wealth, in-
terest, and opportunity," and its politics dominated by a struggle
between "rural reactionaries and a frightened elite . . . pushed
as never before to justify its existence." 25 If he is dorrect, it is en-
tirely possible that, far from expressing a stable consensus, the
legal rules may embody one class's attempts to promote, or to re-
sist, change. 26 Similarly, if John Murrin is right that Massachu-
24 See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
25Lockridge, Social Change and the Meaning of the American Revolution, in
COLONIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPmENTr 490, 510,
515 (2d ed. S. Katz ed. 1976).
26 Discussing enforcement of laws against moral deviance, Nelson comments:
The source of most of these stringent standards lay in the Puritan begin-
nings of New England. Although Puritanism had lost much of its forcefulness
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setts was becoming "anglicized" in the late 18th century, and that
one of the signs of this was increasing professionalization of bench
and bar, then the rules may reflect little more than lawyers' be-
witchment with English models.
27
The point is that it is impossible to decide what social reality a
legal rule represents-how most people behave, how most people
think, how one group thinks, how nobody but lawyers think
-without some attention to a great web of processes. That web
includes the social functions of litigation in the culture; nonjudicial
sources of coercive and normative direction such as families,
churches and employers; the extent of differentiation of legal from
other norms and occupations; and the role of the courts in govern-
ment and politics.
28
Nelson's sections on procedure, judicial control of juries,
pleading reform and revision of appellate process are especially
valuable because they provide some insight into the shape of the
web connecting law and society. Nelson shows thatin provincial
Massachusetts various devices available in England to control
juries-special pleadings, instructions, postverdict motions-were
left undeveloped or unused. Parties usually tried cases under the
general issue; instructions were cursory or even conflicting when
several judges delivered charges seriatim; and postverdict motions
by the 1760s, juries of the period, perhaps only as a matter of reflex, con-
tinued to give effect to puritanical traditions (p. 37) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
Also, pointing to the importance of the oath in provincial procedure, Nelson con-
cludes:
The colonial approach to evidentiary questions rested in large part, then,
on a conception of truth that we do not share. The conception-that truth
would emerge not from a weighing of credibilities and probabilities but from
the sanctity of an oath-looked backward to earlier times, in which God-
fearing men had attached enormous importance to a solemn oath. To the ex-
tent that such notions persisted, they reduced somewhat the power of juries to
determine facts both by keeping evidence from them and by reducing their
freedom in weighing the evidence that they heard (pp. 25-26) (emphasis
added).
These exquisite hedges register Nelson's awareness of, but do not solve, the prob-
lems that changing values pose for his view that law represented social consensus.
27 Murrin, The Legal Transformation: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth Century
Massachusetts, in COLONIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIAL DEVELOP-
MENT 415 (1st ed. S. Katz ed. 1971).
28 It is instructive to contrast Nelson's book in this respect with the classic ac-
count of law in 17th century Massachusetts, G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHOUTY IN
EARLY MASSACHUSETTS (1960), which really does succeed in placing the legal order
in the context of the total culture-its religious and political norms and institutions,
social structure, economy, etc. It may be that the much greater differentiation of
legal activities from other kinds of social activities in the 18th century led Nelson to
believe that law could be studied as a relatively autonomous phenomenon. If so, I
think he, like many legal historians, has made a mistake.
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provided no effective sanction against juries who ignored instruc-
tions (pp. 21-28).
After the revolution all this changed. By 1820, a series of pro-
cedural reforms had shifted the lawfinding function from the jury
to the judge. Trial was before a single judge, and trial de novo
before the full bench of the Supreme Judicial Court was abolished.
This reform had the effect not only of simplifying jury instructions
but also of placing another level of review-full court review on a
bill of exceptions-above the trial process. At the same time, the
courts began to develop supervisory mechanisms, expecially mo-
tions after verdict, for the relief of litigants whose juries had failed
to decide in accordance with the instructions or the evidence (pp.
166-70).
Equally dramatic changes overtook the rules of pleading. In
his most detailed and carefully documented chapter, Nelson shows
that the Massachusetts courts moved gradually after the revolution
to rid common law pleading of its extreme technicality and for-
malism. The courts began by freely allowing amendment for trivial
defects of form, and then went on to overlook the pleading mis-
takes of parties who brought the wrong writ, so long as the basis
for the action was clear. They also loosened up defensive pleading,
slowly promoting a unitary defensive plea. Eventually, Nelson ar-
gues, their impatience with technicality led the judges to the point
where they perceived substantive bases of obligation beneath the
ancient procedural categories of the writs, and as they perceived
these bases they began to articulate them, using their new author-
ity to develop law on their own. Substance and procedure became
distinct categories in their minds: the pleading process came to be
understood -simply as an instrument for giving notice of the essen-
tial elements of a claim (pp. 77-88).
These developments naturally simplify the task of the historian
attempting to extrapolate social consequences from legal rules. The
rules were increasingly the work of American judges, rather than
excerpts from English books, and they were far less vulnerable to
subversion by juries.
Legal procedures, however, represent only a few of the
strands connecting the legal and social systems. For the most part,
Nelson ignores the other strands, or substitutes for them the sup-
positions of policy analysis. For example, a short account of the
postrevolutionary economic changes that turned Massachusetts into
an "industrialized, market economy that reached into the interior
of the state" leads into the assertion that "[flollowing such a trans-
formation in the economy, change was inevitable in the rules of
law" (p. 147). Nelson certainly demonstrates that changes in the
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rules occurred. He does not, however, show why such change was
"inevitable": he does not indicate what newly forged links had
made commercial practice and common law courts interdependent.
Furthermore, the critical question-how is it that judges and en-
trepreneurs both came to perceive courts as important places to
resolve disputes and as important agencies for the promotion of
social change?-remains unexplored. 29 It is insufficient to regard
the view as the inevitable product of commercialization or of in-
dustrialization. Some of the available evidence weakens that pre-
sumption. For example, English judges and businessmen ap-
parently did not share the perception of the utility of courts for
industry; England lagged far behind the United States in develop-
ing legal devices to facilitate corporate enterprise. Yet England's
entrepreneurs found they could function without such devices, and
did. 30
III
There is a danger that readers will take away the wrong im-
pression from the peculiar combination of virtues and defects of
this book-its magnificence as research into the history of legal
doctrine and procedure and its tendentiousness as social explana-
tion. Perhaps readers will conclude that lawyer-historians should
stick to technical legal history in the traditional mode. As one who
is convinced that the older mode of historiography-with its focus
upon the "development" of the internal details of the common
law-led all too often to anachronism or to triviality, I can only
celebrate the present shift towards a merger of legal and general
history.31
My criticism centers not on Nelson's approach to fuse legal
and general history but rather on his execution of that approach.
29 1 am at present engaged in trying to answer this question for New York in the
early 19th century, and had hoped that Nelson's book would throw some light on It
for Massachusetts. A promising beginning has been made towards discovering how
judges arrived at this perception in Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental
Conception of American Law, 1780-1820, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTOnY
287 (1971).
30 For one of the very few treatments of the relationship between law and
economic change in Europe, see Landes, The Structure of Enterprise in the
Nineteenth Century, in 5 RAPPORTS, COMTP INTERNATIONALE DES SCIENCES
HISTORIQUES, XI CONGRkS INTERNATIONALE 107 (1960). A splendid recent study by
Richard Danzig treats the relationship between law and social change in England.
Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 249 (1975).
31 Nelson has made some very sensible and illuminating remarks on this subject
in Nelson, Legal History, ANNUAL SURVEY AMi. L. 625 (1974).
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The kind of legal history that I want to see -written would produce
books far different from Nelson's, and perhaps less interesting.
Their scope would be severely limited in time, locality and legal
subject. Thus they would run the risk of sinking into a monographic
obscurity from which the historian could only rescue them by re-
lating them to general social theories of law. But Nelson's book
illustrates as well as anything could the drawbacks of an approach
that sacrifices depth to breadth. The legal historian cannot trans-
form doctrinal history into social and intellectual history with a
simple assumption that legal rules directly mirror social behavior
and attitudes. If Americanization of the Common Law manages to
get that point across, its weaknesses will prove as instructive as its
considerable strengths.
ROBERT W. GORDON*
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
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